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Abstract 
In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories using the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this 
approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 
1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. 
After the recognition task, participants’ statements were contradicted by giving them feedback 
about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false 
memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task 
after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual 
representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to 
identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social 
desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false 
memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved 
false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our 
individual differences measures and the formation of nonbelieved memories.  
 
Keywords: nonbelieved memories; autobiographical belief; false memory; DRM 
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Exploring the Consequences of Nonbelieved Memories in the DRM Paradigm 
Our behavior is guided by previous experiences. Think, for example, about those 
occasions that you do not want to talk to a friend because you just had an argument with them. 
Or that you avoid dogs because of an adverse experience in your childhood when a pitbull had 
bitten you. On such occasions, our previous experience determines how we react in the future. 
That is, the past is used not just to interpret current experiences but also to anticipate the future.  
An unresolved question is whether our behavior is predominantly affected by the recollection of 
a previous experience or by the belief that a previous experience occurred. The current set of 
studies explored the independent and combined consequences of belief and recollection on 
behavior. 
Documentation of which precursors affect behavior has frequently concentrated on the 
impact of autobiographical memory on behavior (e.g., Bluck, 2015; Nelson, 1993). However, 
recent research has emphasized that the majority of previous memory research has focused 
squarely on the examination of believed memories (Scoboria et al., 2014). By doing so, memory 
researchers have, perhaps unintentionally, neglected to accurately distinguish between belief and 
recollection. Distinguishing between these constructs is important because a new line of research 
has shown that belief and recollection are distinct constructs (e.g., Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; 
Otgaar, Howe, Clark, Wang, & Merckelbach, 2015; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 
2004).  
According to this new research, (autobiographical) belief refers to the truth-value 
associated with the occurrence of an event, whether or not recollection is present, whereas 
recollection refers to the mental re-experiencing of an event (e.g., Rubin, 2006; Scoboria et al., 
2014). Although in the majority of cases, both belief and recollection co-occur, there are 
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numerous cases in which only autobiographical belief exists in the absence of recollection. Take 
for example your first birthday. Obviously, you believe that this event occurred but you have no 
recollection of this event.  
Theories about implanted false memory stress that when suggestion about fictitious 
events are provided, belief in occurrence must also start and typically does so prior to the 
emergence of false recollections (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 
1997; Scoboria et al., 2004). Numerous studies demonstrate that false beliefs can develop 
without accompanying increases in false recollection (Bernstein, Pernat, & Loftus, 2011; Hart & 
Schooler, 2006; Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 
2006; Scoboria, Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012). Moreover, there are studies showing moderate 
correlations between autobiographical belief and recollection where belief ratings often surpass 
recollection ratings (Scoboria et al., 2004; Sharman & Scoboria, 2009). Of interest for the current 
experiments are recent studies showing that there are instances in which people develop 
recollections of events for which the belief in the occurrence of these events is undermined. 
These memories are called nonbelieved memories (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). 
Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) run counter to the idea that when events are recollected, 
belief in the occurrence of those events is present as well. In the psychological literature, 
anecdotal reports of NBMs have sometimes been reported. These reports range from, for 
example, Jean Piaget remembering, but not believing, that he was kidnapped in his childhood 
(Piaget, 1951) to more serious examples where innocent suspects continue to remember having 
committed a crime while simultaneously not believing the event occurred (Brainerd, 2013). 
Apart from these anecdotal reports, research in the area of NBMs is relatively scarce. The first 
empirical demonstration on naturally occurring NBMs was conducted by Mazzoni, Scoboria, and 
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Harvey (2010). In this study, they tested a large sample of participants in order to identify people 
with specific NBMs and found that approximately 20% of participants indicated they had a 
NBM.  
Based on this pioneering work (see also Scoboria & Talarico, 2013), researchers became 
interested in the experimentally elicitation of NBMs in the laboratory. Because social feedback is 
considered to be the most important factor to lead to NBMs (Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 
2015), experimental paradigms were selected that used social feedback to engender false 
memories. The rationale was that NBMs could be created in these false memory paradigms when 
participants were told that their false memories were incorrect. Otgaar, Scoboria, and Smeets 
(2013) experimentally evoked NBMs for childhood events using a false memory implantation 
paradigm. In two experiments, they falsely suggested to adults (Experiment 1) and 10-year old 
children (Experiment 2) that they were on a hot air balloon ride in their childhood. Across two 
suggestive interviews, both adults and children produced false memories of the hot air balloon 
experience. Crucially, after these interviews, participants were debriefed and informed that their 
false memory was flawed. The intriguing finding was that 40% of those with false memories 
reported to have a NBM post-debriefing (for related findings, see Clark, Nash, Fincham, & 
Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, Scoboria, Howe, Moldoveanu, & 
Smeets, 2016). 
Empirical work in the area of belief and recollection has shown that NBMs are not as rare 
as once assumed and that they can be set up in an experimental manner. An unsettled question, 
however, is whether our behavior is guided by belief, by recollection, or both. Up until now, no 
studies have looked at this, but the question is highly relevant. Indeed, as Nash, Wheeler, and 
Hope (2015) formulated: “one interesting and as-yet-unanswered empirical question is whether 
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memories per se do indeed guide behavior, or whether it is the belief in the occurrence of those 
remembered events that is the active agent” (p. 320). One of the purposes of the present 
experiments is to dig into this question and explore whether it is belief, recollection, or both that 
contribute to behavior.  
A burgeoning literature exists on the consequences of false beliefs and memories for food 
preferences and choices (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). The question of whether the effects of false 
feedback on food preferences and choices could be fully accounted for by increases in belief or 
memory has recently been addressed (Bernstein, Scoboria, & Arnold, 2015). By combining data 
from eight published experiments (N = 1369), the authors found that belief in occurrence 
predicted changes in food preferences and behavior intentions, and that memory did not add 
additional variance. This finding suggests that belief, not memory, is the operating vehicle for 
changes in behavior.  
In another line of work, researchers have looked at the positive consequences of false 
memories (Howe, 2011). In these experiments, researchers have used a powerful and robust 
procedure to elicit false memories, the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here, participants receive wordlists containing 
associatively-related concepts (e.g., tears, bed, child) that are linked to a non-presented critical 
lure word (i.e., cry). Recall and recognition measures show that a significant number of 
participants falsely recollect the critical lure (Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012).  
Recent experimentation has used the DRM paradigm to test whether false memories 
might prime solutions on various problem-solving tasks. For example, Howe, Garner, 
Charlesworth, and Knott (2011) presented children and adults with DRM wordlists. The critical 
lures on these lists also served as the solutions to compound remote associate task (CRAT) 
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problems. These CRATs were presented after the encoding of the DRM wordlists. Interestingly, 
problem solving was easier and faster for false than true memories thereby demonstrating that 
false memories are more beneficial than true memories when priming solutions to problems.  
We have recently shown that false memories can even prime tasks linked to intelligence 
(Otgaar et al., 2015). In two experiments, participants were visually presented with DRM 
wordlists and received a recognition task. After this, participants received a modified perceptual 
closure task. In this task, participants were presented with degraded visual representations of 
words (false, true, and unrelated items) that became clearer over time. Participants had to provide 
identifications as soon as possible. Such a task is linked to certain subtasks of intelligence tests in 
which degraded pictures are presented and participants have to come up with an answer as soon 
as possible (e.g., Luteijn & Barelds, 2004). We found that false memories were identified faster 
than true memories and unrelated items. Again, these data imply that in certain situations, false 
memories can have positive consequences.  
The current experiments have two aims. First, because no experimental work has been 
done on the consequences of NBMs (but see also Wang, Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, Merckelbach, & 
Nahouli, in press), we explored the consequences of NBMs on a PCT task. Second, to examine 
this issue, we decided to use the DRM paradigm to elicit NBMs. Although the DRM paradigm 
has not been used before to elicit NBMs, it is an excellent method to do so. That is, in the DRM 
paradigm, robust and high levels of true and false memories are simultaneously elicited 
(Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) and this situation grants the possibility to 
successfully induce NBMs. Indeed, previous work from our lab (Otgaar et al., 2016) has adapted 
the imagination inflation paradigm to elicit NBMs. In the imagination inflation paradigm, both 
true and false memories are evoked and NBMs are easily created. Hence, our prediction would 
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be that NBMs could potentially be elicited in the DRM paradigm. Experiments 1 and 2 were 
conducted to examine whether the DRM paradigm could be employed to create NBMs. To 
foreshadow our findings, the answer is yes. That is, we show that the DRM paradigm can be 
used to elicit both nonbelieved true and nonbelieved false memories.  
In Experiment 2, we also explored the behavioral consequences of NBMs. We used the 
perceptual closure task as a proxy for a behavioral task to examine these consequences. The 
reason for choosing this task was the following. First, previous work using CRATs is somewhat 
limited as the CRAT procedure still resembles a DRM procedure (i.e., presentation of words that 
are associatively related to the solution word). We wanted to use a task that was not similar to a 
DRM task but which could be still used to examine the consequences of NBMs. Second, a 
perceptual closure task is in essence a picture completion task and parallels certain subtasks of 
intelligence in which degraded pictures need to be identified as fast as possible (Luteijn & 
Barelds, 2004). Here, participants were first presented with DRM lists and then received a 
recognition task. Next, participants received feedback about certain items suggesting that the 
items were not presented. This was done to create NBMs. Following this, participants had to 
complete the perceptual closure task. Because this is the first study looking into the aftereffects 
of NBMs, no strong predictions could be made. However, based on earlier work on the effects of 
false beliefs on food preferences (Bernstein & Scoboria, 2015), one prediction would be that 
when belief is undermined, this adversely impacts the performance on the perceptual closure 
task. The reasoning behind this is that belief drives behavioral consequences even on tasks such 
as the perceptual closure task. Specifically, according to this prediction, nonbelieved true and 
false memories would prime identifications to a lesser extent than believed true and false 
memories. On the other hand, if the perceptual closure task is regarded as a recognition or 
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identification task, something that implies that participants need a recollection to successfully 
complete the task, then when belief is undermined, this would not affect identification 
performance. Furthermore, this would imply that items that are believed, but not recollected, 
would be worse primes on the perceptual closure task compared to nonbelieved true and false 
memories.  
We were also interested in some other exploratory goals. First, Mazzoni and colleagues 
(2010) showed that NBMs were more likely to contain negative emotions. Hence, in the current 
experiments, we used neutral and negative DRM lists to explore the consequences of emotion 
and NBMs on behavior. Second, as previous work has consistently looked at phenomenological 
features of NBMs (visual, auditory details, etc.; e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010), we examined these 
features as well. Third, our knowledge about which persons might be at high risk to create NBMs 
is limited. Hence, in Experiment 2, we added several individual differences scales. Because 
social feedback is regarded as one of the main contributors to NBMs (Scoboria et al., 2015), we 
included compliance and social desirability scales. Furthermore, NBMs are less connected to 
other memories, implying a lower sense of self, which can be associated with certain types of 
dissociative experiences (e.g., derealization). Thus, a dissociation scale was included as well.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-seven students from the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht 
University participated voluntarily in this experiment in exchange for credit points or a financial 
reimbursement. One participant was excluded due to misunderstanding the instructions, thus 
leaving a total of 26 participants (30% male, 70% female) for the subsequent analysis. All 
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participants were undergraduate students, fluent in English, aged between 18 and 34 (Mage= 
22.58, SD = 3.46). Participating in a similar memory-related study was considered an exclusion 
criterion. The experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Materials 
 DRM Lists We used 12 DRM lists (6 neutral and 6 negative) in this experiment.  These 
lists have successfully been used in previous research (Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013). Each of 
the DRM lists consisted of 10 words (list example: door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, 
curtain, view, screen) and a non-presented target or “critical lure” (e.g., window).  The words 
were presented as audio files by means of a PowerPoint presentation, with a tempo of 1.5 
seconds per word and a 1.5 seconds break between the lists. The audio files were recorded with 
the help of a native English-speaking student.    
 The recognition task contained 108 words. Of these words, 48 were hits that were 
presented in the DRM lists (e.g., door, pane, ledge, house), 12 were critical lures (e.g., window), 
and 48 words were not presented and unrelated (e.g., daisy, pine, leaf, root) items.  The presented 
words used in this task were taken from first, third, fifth, and seventh positions in the DRM lists.  
 Memory Characteristics Questionnaire An adapted six-item (7-point Likert scale) 
version of the Memory Characteristic Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1998) was used to compare phenomenological ratings of different types of memories elicited 
(true; false; nonbelieved true; nonbelieved false; believed-non-remembered true and believed-
non-remembered false memories). The selected items were about clarity, visual details, sound, 
vividness, event detail, and tone of the memories (-/+). Another 7-point Likert scale item 
regarding familiarity was added (i.e., “This word is for me” with answers from “not at all 
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familiar” to “very familiar”). These items were chosen to assess key features associated with 
recollection in prior work and for their relevance to the characteristics of this study.   
Design and Procedure 
We used a 2 (Emotion: Neutral vs. Negative) x 2 (Challenge: Yes vs. No) within-
participant design. Participants were tested individually for approximately 90 minutes each in lab 
facilities at the faculty. They were first presented with the neutral and negative DRM lists in a 
counterbalanced fashion and instructed to listen and memorize the words from the lists. After 
this, a short filler task (i.e., find the differences) for 5 minutes was completed. Following this, 
participants received the recognition task. In this task, participants were instructed to think of the 
words presented on the lists and circle “yes” if they remembered the words and “no” if they did 
not remember them. If a word was remembered, participants had to provide memory and belief 
ratings on a 8-point scale (i.e., “Do you have a memory for this word?” with answers ranging 
from “no memory at all” to “clear and complete memory”; and “Do you believe that this word 
was presented to you?” with answers ranging from “definitely did not happen” to “definitely did 
happen”; Scoboria et al., 2004). When a word was not recognized as presented, the participants 
had to circle the answer “no” and move on to the next word.  
After the recognition task was completed, the experimenter checked the participants’ 
answers and offered feedback regarding the accuracy of the answers. That is, some words were 
challenged regarding their presence on the DRM lists, regardless of whether the answers were 
correct or not. For example, the word “window” was a critical lure in this experiment. If the 
participants recognized it, then the experimenter challenged their answer by saying that this was 
not true (i.e., “it was not present on the lists”). In this case, we attempted to create nonbelieved 
false memories. The same situation occurred, for example, for the word “pane”, which was 
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presented in the lists, but challenged as well in case it was recognized by the participant. In this 
case, the experimenter deliberately deceived the participants to elicit nonbelieved true memories. 
As in previous research, NBMs were scored when the belief rating was 2 points lower than the 
memory ratings (e.g., Clark et al., 2012). 
 The challenge was done using two predetermined series of words. Importantly, in this 
experiment, words were challenged only if the participant recognized, correctly or falsely, the 
specific word. Verbal feedback was provided, alongside false external evidence in the form of a 
fake written proof. The experimenter wrote down the answers. The fake proof consisted of a fake 
transcript of the audio files (i.e., lists) and the words written in the same order as in the 
recognition task and with “no, not presented” or “yes, presented” reported next to each word. 
As mentioned, there were two predetermined series of words used for the challenge that 
were counterbalanced together with the two sets of DRM wordlists (i.e., neutral and negative). 
The predetermined series of challenged words consisted of half of the critical lures (6 in total 
with 3 neutral and 3 negative) and 12 presented items (6 neutral and 6 negative). The presented 
items used for the challenge were taken from the third position in the DRM lists. After the 
challenge, participants had to provide memory and belief ratings once more and were also asked 
to provide ratings on certain MCQ items again. The number of remembered words varied across 
participants, thus the number of challenges and the number of words with memory characteristics 
recorded also varied per participant in this experiment. While the experimenter checked the 
answers from the recognition task, participants had to complete another, similar, filler task (5 
minutes). At the end, the participants were debriefed and given a form with more details about 
the experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
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Recognition Task  
Regarding the answers on the recognition task, a repeated measures ANOVA showed that 
negative hit rates (M = 0.76, SD = 0.16) were statistically higher than neutral hit rates (M = 0.68, 
SD = 0.16; F(1, 25) = 7.07, p = .01, ƞpartial² = .22). No statistical differences were found for false 
recognition (negative: M = 0.73, SD = 0.25; neutral: M = 0.69, SD = 0.17; F(1, 25) = 0.57, p = 
.46, ƞpartial² = .02). 
Rates of Different Memory Types 
 Before the challenge, all participants had true memories (i.e., hits; N = 26, min 1 – max 
11, M = 6.27, SD = 2.78) and 92% (N = 24, M = 2.69, SD = 1.49, min 1 - max 5) had at least one 
false memory. Also, there were some cases of spontaneous NBMs that were elicited without the 
event being challenged for 42.3% of the participants (N= 11, M= 2.19, SD= 4.09, min 1- max 
16). Out of these, 34.6% of the participants (N = 9, M = 1.31, SD = 2.85, min1 - max 13) had at 
least one spontaneous nonbelieved false memory and 34.6% (N = 9, M = .88, SD = 1.72, min 1 -
max 7) had at least one spontaneous nonbelieved true memory.  
 The most important findings refer to whether participants created nonbelieved memories 
in the DRM paradigm after being challenged. After being challenged, several memory types 
could occur. Participants could accept the challenge leading to nonbelieved memories, believed, 
non-remembered events, or nonbelieved, non-remembered events. As the challenges in this case 
occurred only if the words were recognized as presented, 25.43% of the events were challenged 
(N = 333, M = 12.81, SD = 3.00, range 7-17). The challenges were rejected (i.e., participants did 
not go along with the challenge) in 72.07% of the cases (N = 240, M = 9.23, SD = 3.44, with a 
minimum of 3 rejections per participant and a maximum of 16; all participants had at least one 
rejection), accepted in 27.74% of the cases (N = 93, M = 3.58, SD = 2.85). In general, after the 
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challenges irrespective if the challenge was accepted or rejected, there were 69.97% (233/333 x 
100%) believed memories (N = 233, 70 false, 163 true memories), 9.9% nonbelieved memories 
(N = 33, 24 true, 9 false), 2.1% believed, non-remembered (N = 7, 6 true, 1 false) and 18% 
nonbelieved non-remembered events (N = 60; see Table 1). If we look specifically at rates of 
different memory types for accepted challenges, then we find the following: nonbelieved 
memory true: n = 21, nonbelieved memory false: n = 9, believed, not remembered true: n = 4.  
Additionally, out of the total number of nonbelieved memories, 33.3% were negative (N 
= 11, 9 true, 2 false) and the rest were neutral (N = 22, 15 true, 7 false). No statistically 
significant difference was found between neutral and negative NBMs.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Memory Characteristics 
 Purely for exploratory purposes, we also conducted univariate analyses with Bonferroni 
correction on the different phenomenological features (e.g., clarity) of the different memory 
types. For clarity, we only found that true memories (hits; M = 4.71, SD = 1.44) received 
statistically higher clarity ratings than false memories (M = 3.50, SD = 1.65; p = .004; F(5, 114) 
= 2.98, p = .01, ƞpartial² = .12). This effect was also evident for visual details. Visual details were 
higher in true (M = 4.50, SD = 1.43) than in false memories (M = 3.31, SD = 1.55, p = .004; F(5, 
114) = 3.45, p = .006, ƞpartial² = .13). No statistical differences were found for sound, vividness, 
event detail, tone of memory, or familiarity.  
 The results from Experiment 1 clearly show that the DRM paradigm can be used to elicit 
NBMs. As can be seen, we succeeded in evoking NBMs in about 10% (n = 33) of the items that 
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were challenged. This percentage is quite similar to percentages in previous experiments (e.g., 
8.33%; Mazzoni et al., 2014). Furthermore, we showed that other memory types (e.g., believed 
memories, believed not remembered) could be induced as well and revealed that nonbelieved 
true memory rates were descriptively higher than nonbelieved false memory rates.  
 Because Experiment 1 confirmed that the DRM paradigm could evoke NBMs, 
Experiment 2 was conducted to replicate this and explore the behavioral consequences of NBMs 
by using a perceptual closure task. To make sure we created a sufficient number of NBMs to 
perform meaningful analyses and because several observed null effects (e.g., the effect of 
emotion on NBM formation) might be due to low power, we doubled our sample size. Also, in 
Experiment 1 the number of challenges could vary between participants and this could have led 
to some participants creating more NBMs than others. Hence, we changed this in Experiment 2 
by providing participants with a fixed number of challenges. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
We tested 52 participants, with one excluded due to misunderstanding the instructions. 
Out of the 51 participants left, 18 were male and 33 female, with age ranging from 18 to 35 years 
old (Mage= 21.63, SD= 2.93). All participants were undergraduate students at Maastricht 
University, except one that had a PhD position. All participants were fluent in English and 
received credit points or a financial reimbursement for their participation. No participant took 
part in a similar memory experiment or in the previous experiment.  
Materials 
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 DRM Lists The same DRM lists and recognition task were used as in Experiment 1. The 
words were visually presented and the presentation was constructed in PowerPoint 2010 using 
pictures of the words to be presented. We had to provide words visually and not verbally (as in 
Experiment 1) because the perceptual closure task is a picture completion task. The pictures were 
created using Adobe Photoshop CS5, with the words displayed in the “Calibri” font, size “125pt” 
and picture resolutions of 1680x1050, font color black on a white background. Presenting the 
lists as visual stimuli was done to parallel the perceptual closure task, which contained visual 
representations of words.  
 Perceptual Closure Task A digitalized perceptual closure task (PCT) was used 
including 84 words in total (see also Otgaar et al., 2015). Twenty-four of these words were 
presented in the DRM lists and in the recognition task (i.e., hits), 24 were presented only in the 
lists but not included in the recognition task (i.e., hits new), 12 were the critical lures, 12 were 
non-presented unrelated words that were in the recognition task as well (i.e., unrelated) and 12 
non-presented unrelated words that were new (i.e., unrelated new). The words were displayed as 
pictures (10 for each word) containing a distortion filter that becomes clearer over time. This task 
measures the accuracy and the reaction times for the recognition of the words using the software 
E-Prime 2.0.  The distorted pictures were created using free software, GIMP 2.0 (we used the 
filter Blinds (Distorts) option in GIMP 2.0 and used a horizontal displacement of 90 and n 
segments at 25, 25, 40, 45, 55, 65, 70, respectively 95. The next filter had a displacement of 70 
and an n segment of 100). The last picture was the one originally created using Adobe Photoshop 
CS5.  Out of the 24 words that were presented in the lists and in the recognition task, 12 were 
challenged, thus adding a high probability of including NBMs in the PCT. Half of the critical 
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lures were also challenged. The challenged words represented maximum 21.5% of the total of 
words that the PCT contained.  
Individual Differences  
 Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putman, 1986) The DES is a self-
report measure that assesses the degree to which individuals experience dissociation. It consists 
of 28 items. Furthermore, on a visual analogue scale, participants have to indicate how 
frequently they experience dissociative symptoms. Examples of items are “Some people have the 
experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got there” or “Some 
people are told that they sometimes do not recognize friends or family members”. The scale is 
ranging from 0% (Never) to 100% (Always) in 10% increments. The total score is the mean of all 
items and it is ranging from 0 to 100. It has a good internal consistency with Cronbach α= .92. 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989, 1997) The GCS consists of 20 
statements answered true or false and it is constructed as a self-report questionnaire (examples of 
items: “I give in easily when I am pressured” or “I tend to go along with what people tell me 
even when I know that they are wrong”) measuring compliance (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 
2003). Each answer that suggests compliance is scored with one point. After administering, 
scores are summed (range 0-20), with higher scores reflecting more compliant behavior. The 
GCS has good reliability, an internal consistency of .71 and a test-retest reliability coefficient of 
.88 (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) The 
MC-SDS was designed to measure social desirability independent of psychopathology. The scale 
assesses whether respondents are answering truthfully or are misrepresenting themselves in order 
to manage their self-presentation. The scale has 33 items using a true/false response format (e.g.  
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“I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble”, “It is sometimes hard for me 
to go on with my work if I am not encouraged”). Crowne and Marlowe (1960) showed that the 
internal consistency is .88, and the test-retest correlation .89.  
Design and Procedure 
A 2 (Emotion: Neutral vs. Negative) x 2 (Challenge: Yes vs. No) within-participant 
design was used. Participants were tested individually and were presented with all tasks in four 
counterbalanced orders (similar to Experiment 1), in an approximately 120-minute session each.  
First, participants were presented with the DRM wordlists and asked to memorize the 
words. Next, participants received the recognition task. After the recognition task was 
completed, the experimenter checked the answers and challenged certain items by giving verbal 
feedback. In this experiment, we presented participants with a fixed number of challenges 
according to two predetermined sets of words. Because the number of challenges was fixed, it 
could be that items that were not recognized were also challenged (i.e., here it was said that the 
item was presented). In other words, a word was challenged whether it was recognized as 
presented or not presented by the participant. However, although items could be challenged 
whether recognized or not, in line with previous work on nonbelieved memories (e.g., Otgaar et 
al., 2016), in this experiment, we were only interested in and only report on the data of items that 
were recognized and challenged. As research has shown that social feedback is the most often 
reported reason leading to the formation of nonbelieved memories (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010), 
and because in Experiment 1 our impression was that the fake proof did not add substantially to 
our challenge manipulation, we also made the following change in the procedure. So, the written 
fake proof was not used anymore and only social feedback was given in Experiment 2. Memory 
characteristics were asked only for the words that were recognized.  
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After the recognition task and all challenges, participants engaged in the perceptual 
closure task. In this task, they had to press a button as soon as they recognized the distorted 
words, followed by digitally writing what they believed the word was that they identified. The 
words were successively presented. In between each task participants were given a filler task 
(i.e., find the differences). Finally, participants had to fill in the questionnaires regarding 
individual differences. The order of the questionnaires was kept the same for all participants. 
After filling in the questionnaires, participants were debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Recognition Task 
Out of the items presented in the recognition task, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
that participants had statistically higher negative (M = 0.80, SD = 0.15) than neutral hit rates (M 
= 0.73, SD = 0.16; F(1, 50) = 6.20, p = .02, ƞpartial² = .11).  Also, negative false memories (M = 
0.67, SD = 0.25) were statistically higher compared to the neutral false memories (M = 0.54, SD 
= 0.27; F(1, 50) = 10.45, p = .002, ƞpartial² = .17).  
Rates of Different Memory Types 
Before the challenge, almost all participants had true memories
1
 (N = 50, min 1 – max 14, 
M = 7.88, SD = 2.60) and 88.2% (N = 45, M = 3.04, SD = 2.02, min 1- max 7) had at least a false 
memory. Also, there were some cases of spontaneous NBMs that were elicited without the event 
being challenged for 35.3 % of the participants (N = 18, M = 1.24, SD = 2.23, min 1- max 9). Out 
of these, 21.6 % of the participants (N = 11, M = .41, SD = 1.02, min1- max 6) had at least one 
nonbelieved false memory and 27.4 % (N = 14, M = .82, SD = 1.57, min 1-max 6) had at least 
one nonbelieved true memory. 
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 The crucial finding was the number of nonbelieved memories that were created after 
participants were challenged. As for the challenged items, there were 18 challenges per 
participant (17 for one participant). The total number of challenges was 917 (i.e., (18 x 51)-1), 
with 655 (71.4%) challenged items that were recognized as presented (challenged yes, M = 
12.84, SD = 2.51, min 7 - max 18, all participants) and 262 (28.6%) challenged items that were 
not recognized, but still challenged (challenged no, M = 5.15, SD = 2.51, min 0 - max 11, for 50 
participants). The challenges were rejected in 64.8% of the cases (N = 594, M = 11.65, SD = 
3.68, min 2-max 18, all participants had at least one rejection), accepted in 35.2% of the cases (N 
= 323, M = 6.33, SD = 3.72, min 0 - max 16).  
Regarding the memory type status after the challenges for items that were recognized and 
challenged, there were 16.8% non-believed-non-remembered events reported (58 retracted 
memories, 96 still not remembered), 73.3% (480/655 x 100%) believed memories (N = 480, 117 
false, 363 true that were rejected challenges), 13.13% nonbelieved memories (N = 86, with 54 
true, 32 false accepted challenges) and 4.4% believed-non-remembered (N = 29, with 13 true, 16 
false accepted challenge; see also Table 2).  Like Experiment 1, no statistical difference was 
found between neutral and negative NBMs  
[Table 2 here] 
 
Perceptual Closure Task 
We start by reporting the most important findings. To reiterate, we only examined the 
PCT data of memory types for items that were recognized and challenged. Reaction time data are 
reported in milliseconds (i.e., ms). Outliers were removed from the analyses. In total, 34 outliers 
(i.e., reaction time responses) were detected and removed by trimming the data by standard 
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deviations (+/- 2SD; Ratcliff, 1993). Before we could start analyzing the data, we filtered the 
data (see also Otgaar et al., 2015). That is, cases that were incorrectly recognized were removed 
from the perceptual closure task. For example, if a participant pressed the button indicating 
recognition of a word (e.g., house) but then filled in an incorrect response (e.g., mouse), then this 
was removed from the analyses. Of a total of 4284 answers that could be provided, 5.6% were 
incorrect (n = 241) and 93.3% (n = 3998) were correct; the rest were cases in which a button was 
pressed but no answer was typed (n = 45). As has been mentioned earlier, in Experiment 2, we 
used a fixed number of challenges whatever the response of the participants (recognized or not). 
As has been done in earlier work (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2015), for the analyses, we looked at those 
challenged items that were (correctly or falsely) recognized by participants.  
To examine the consequences of NBMs on the identification performance of the 
perceptual closure task, we conducted several analyses. Imputation analyses were performed to 
deal with missing data (Van Ginkel & Van der Ark, 2005). When we performed a repeated 
measures ANOVA on different memory types (true memory (hits); false memory; nonbelieved 
true; nonbelieved false; believed, not-remembered true; believed, not-remembered false), we 
found a statistically significant effect of memory type (F(2.31, 115.40) = 28.41, p < .001, ƞpartial² 
= .36; Greenhouse-Geisser correction).
2
 Post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed the following.  
Nonbelieved false memory items were identified statistically faster than all other memory types 
except for the false memory items (ps < .0001). In contrast, except for the believed, not-
remembered true items, nonbelieved true memory items were identified statistically slower than 
all other items (ps < .03). This was also true for believed, not-remembered true items: they were 
also identified slower than all other memory types (ps < .001). Finally, we found that believed, 
not-remembered false items were identified statistically slower than nonbelieved false memories 
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(p < .001). So, undermining belief has different consequences for true and false memories 
(Figure 1). 
 Because the different memory types were unequally distributed among participants, we 
also conducted a mixed-model analysis on the data (Cnaan, Laird, & Slasor, 1997; West, Welch, 
& Galecki, 2007). A roughly similar pattern was observed as reported before. A main effect of 
memory types was observed (F(5, 136) = 3.70, p = .004). Again, identifications were statistically 
faster for the nonbelieved false memory items than for true memory, nonbelieved true memories, 
and believed, not-remembered true items (ps < .03). Furthermore, we found higher reaction times 
(slow identification) for the nonbelieved true memory items than (nonbelieved) false memory 
items (ps < .02). Once more, we found support that believed, not-remembered true items were 
slower identified than all other memory types (ps <. 03) except for the nonbelieved true items.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
Exploratory Analyses 
Emotion We also explored whether our effects would be different for neutral and 
negative true and false memories (and NBMs). However, when we added the factor Emotion in 
the mixed-model, the effect was not statistically significant (F(1, 223) = 0.29, p = .59).  
Memory Characteristics As in Experiment 1, we found that true memories (M = 4.87, 
SD = 1.54) were experienced as having more clarity than false memories (M = 3.92, SD = 1.67, p 
= .002; F(5, 237) = 5.78, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .11), nonbelieved true memories (M = 3.59, SD = 
1.29, p = .001), and believed, not-remembered true items (M = 3.13, SD = 1.38, p = .04). Also, 
visual details were statistically (F(5, 237) = 5.44, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .10) more present in true 
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(M= 4.64, SD = 1.61) than in false memories (M = 3.69, SD = 1.66, p = .003) and nonbelieved 
true memories (M = 3.40, SD = 1.47, p = .046).  
For vividness ratings, believed, not-remembered false items (M = 3.96, SD = 2.51) were 
experienced as more vivid (F(5, 237) = 5.09, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .10) than true memories (M = 
2.48, SD = 1.55, p = .03), false memories (M = 2.11, SD = 1.41, p = .003), nonbelieved true (M = 
1.56, SD = 1.10, p < .001), and nonbelieved false memories (M = 2.21, SD = 1.77, p = .03). We 
also found that false memory items (M = 6.05, SD = 1.13) were rated as more familiar (F(5, 237) 
= 5.10, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .10) than true memories (M = 5.39, SD = 1.22, p = .03) and believed, 
not remembered true items (M = 4.38, SD = 2.62, p = .01). No statistically significant differences 
were found for sound, details, and tone of memory.
2  
To conclude, we again showed that the DRM paradigm can successfully be used to 
experimentally induce nonbelieved memories. Furthermore, we found that surrendering belief 
has differential effects for true and false memories. That is, whereas nonbelieved false memories 
were identified faster on the PCT, nonbelieved true memories were identified much slower than 
most of the other memory categories. We will discuss the relevance of these findings next.  
General Discussion 
In the current experiments, we examined whether NBMs could be created when using the 
DRM paradigm. Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed whether the DRM paradigm 
could be used to induce nonbelieved true and false memories. Our data showed that we were 
successful in this endeavor. Experiment 2 was conducted to explore the ramifications of NBMs 
on a modified perceptual closure task. We found that undermining belief had opposing 
consequences for true and false memory. 
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Our most consistent finding of the current experiments was that reliable levels of NBMs 
could be elicited when relying on the DRM paradigm. Indeed, after being challenged, we found 
comparable levels of nonbelieved memories in both experiments (Experiment 1: 9.9% (n = 33); 
Experiment 2: 13.13% (n = 86). That the DRM paradigm can be used to experimentally evoke 
nonbelieved memories is important because previous work has revealed that the elicitation of 
NBMs is quite challenging (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2013). Hence, it is important to look for new ways 
to undermine belief and elicit NBMs. The advantage of procedures such as the DRM paradigm is 
that each participant can create many true and false memories and this creation increases the 
chances of multiple NBMs within one participant. Indeed, we have recently evoked NBMs by 
using an adaptation of an imagination inflation procedure (Otgaar et al., 2016). In that study, 
participants had to perform, imagine, and heard action statements (e.g., break the toothpick), 
imagined certain actions multiple times, and received a recognition test two weeks later. Here 
too, many true and false memories could be produced within a participant and after being 
challenged, we found, as in the current experiments, that NBMs could be elicited.  
In Experiment 2, we also explored the consequences of NBMs on a perceptual closure 
task. Although we should be careful in interpreting our findings, the results from Experiment 2 
imply that undermining belief has contrasting consequences for true and false memories. 
Specifically, when participants’ true and false recollections were challenged and ended up in 
nonbelieved true and false memories, a divergent pattern of PCT results emerged. Nonbelieved 
false memory items were better (i.e., more quickly) identified than most of the other memory 
types. By contrast, our analyses showed that for nonbelieved true memory items, identifications 
became worse and thus slower than many other memory types.  
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What this implies is that for false memories, when belief is undermined and recollection 
remains intact, performance on the PCT improves in that it leads to faster reaction times. 
Previous research has already provided proof that when using tasks such as the ones we used 
combined with the DRM paradigm, false memories prime problem solutions (e.g., 
identifications) much better than true memories (e.g., Howe, Threadgold et al., 2013; Howe et 
al., in press; Otgaar et al., 2015). These findings have fuelled the idea that under many 
circumstances, false memories can have many beneficial outcomes. That recollection is vital for 
affecting behavioral consequences can also be seen in the identification performance of believed, 
not-remembered false memories. They were identified statistically slower than nonbelieved false 
memories suggesting again that it is recollection, and not belief, that drives the behavioral 
consequences of false memories.  
For true memories, we found the completely opposite pattern. Here, we showed that 
when belief was undermined leading to nonbelieved true memories, identifications were made 
much slower than other memory types. This indicates that for true memories, belief is a crucial 
factor in guiding behavior on the PCT. Furthermore, this result corresponds well with recent 
research showing that behavioral tasks such as food choices and preferences were determined by 
belief and not recollection (Bernstein et al., 2015). However, we also found that believed, not-
remembered true items were identified much slower than, for example, true memories. This 
seems to be in contrast with the idea that belief is the most important element in completing the 
PCT.  
The finding that belief is important for true memories is in line with a recent study (Wang 
et al., in press) on the consequences of NBMs on behavior. In this study, nonbelieved memories 
were also elicited using the DRM paradigm and then participants received insight-based 
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problems in the form of CRATs (Howe et al., 2010). Like our Experiment 2, the findings from 
their second experiment also suggested that when belief was undermined for true memories, 
fewer problems were solved. However, in this experiment, this effect was also present for false 
memories. Of course, in our second experiment, we looked at the consequences of NBMs by 
looking at reaction times, while in the study by Wang and colleagues, the consequences of 
NBMs were examined by focusing on solution rates. Still, our results and the results by Wang 
and colleagues do show that belief seems to play an important role in guiding behavior but more 
studies using different paradigms are necessary.  
Although speculative, in our opinion, there are two possible explanations for our findings 
concerning the consequences of nonbelieved true memories. First, the result that slower 
identifications were observed for both nonbelieved true memories and believed, not-remembered 
true items suggests that for true memories, belief and recollection both play a major role in 
guiding behavior. What this suggests is that at least for tasks as our PCT, having both a belief 
and a recollection determine whether you can successfully (i.e., quickly) complete the task. 
When belief or recollection is undermined, this adversely affects performance. Indeed, the idea 
that belief and recollection are relevant can be seen from the finding that true memories were 
identified more rapidly than when belief or recollection was absent. Of course, there is also an 
alternative possibility. Perhaps presenting participants with feedback about their authentic 
recollections confuses participants and this negatively impacts their representation of items (e.g., 
words). This confusion about their own representations might make them slower in their 
identification for both nonbelieved memories and believed, not-remembered items. Although 
possible, the idea that feedback causes confusion regarding participants’ representations across 
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the board (i.e., for belief and recollection) is unlikely, as we did not find such a general effect for 
false memory.  
Our finding that undermining belief has different consequences for true and false 
memories begs the question about the possible reasons for this divergent pattern. One option is to 
relate our finding to how recent work has viewed the adaptive function of true and false memory 
(e.g., Howe, 2011; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Otgaar & Howe, 2014; Schacter, Guerin, & St. 
Jacques, 2011). According to this line of work, memory evolved to process information relevant 
for survival purposes and to simulate future events that might improve prospective decision-
making. This flexibility in imaginative processes foments the production of false memory and so, 
according to this interpretation, false memories might be regarded as simple by-products of a 
flexible memory system.  
However, this work has also revealed that false memories often exert positive and 
adaptive functions. For example, there is documentation showing that false memories are linked 
to creativity (Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, & Ormerod, 2011). Other work has revealed that 
counterfactual thinking (i.e., mental simulations of alternative outcomes to past experiences), 
which is regarded as an adaptive construct, is closely connected with the formation of false 
memories (Gerlach, Dornblasser, & Schacter, 2013). Finally, studies have shown that false 
memories frequently serve as better primes on problem-solving tasks than true memories (e.g., 
Howe, Threadgold et al., 2013; Howe et al., in press; Otgaar et al., 2015). These findings suggest 
that false memories are not simple by-products and can have consequences in many different 
areas.  
One likely candidate for why true and false memories behave differently when belief is 
undermined is because false memories are self-generated and true memories are other-generated 
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(Howe et al., in press). That is, false memories that are elicited in the DRM paradigm are the 
result of internal processes such as imagination, source monitoring, and associative activation, 
whereas true memories are the result of external input (e.g., experiencing an event) that needs to 
be encoded and consolidated. Processes such as source monitoring and associative activation are 
mechanisms purely related to recollection and hence, are likely to put more weight on 
recollection relative to belief (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993). The implication is that for false memories to have any consequence on behavior, 
recollection must be more relevant than belief. So, if participants’ memories are challenged 
leading to nonbelieved false memories, the recollective part of the memory is driving faster 
reaction times. Interestingly, belief is often linked to concepts such as confidence (Otgaar et al., 
2016). False memories are often expressed with high confidence (e.g., Gallo & Roediger, 2002). 
One interesting but as yet not studied issue is whether nonbelieved false memories in the DRM 
paradigm are characterized by low confidence. If true, this would imply that false memories with 
low confidence could be better primes in tasks such as the perceptual closure task than false 
memories with high confidence. True memories are formed by a diverse set of external output 
such as social influences and thus, belief and recollection are both important in guiding behavior. 
Indeed, for some authors (Nelson, 1993; Nelson & Fivush, 2004), the function of 
(autobiographical) memory is a social one. This view stipulates that the functional significance 
of (autobiographical) memory is to share memories with each other leading to a better retention 
of memories. For such a function to work properly, it is of course important to have both strong 
beliefs and recollections in the occurrence of events before sharing (or deciding to share) 
memories with others.  
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As subsidiary aims, we conducted some exploratory analyses. We did not find that the 
emotional aspect of stimuli affected NBM rates or the performance on the PCT. Although this 
might be seen in contrast with the finding from Mazzoni et al. (2010) that NBMs received higher 
negative emotion ratings than other types of memories, our experiments did not target the kind of 
memories (i.e., autobiographical) that Mazzoni and colleagues tested (see also below). Our 
results also did not find any support for any individual differences that might catalyze NBM 
rates. Of course, this is one of the first studies to examine such individual differences so future 
research should attempt to examine whether this could be replicated. Finally, as in previous 
studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2013), NBMs often did not 
differ from believed memories (true memories) in terms of phenomenology supporting the idea 
that NBMs feel “memory-like”.  
It is important to stress that our findings might be due to alternative explanations. One 
explanation that has also received previous empirical attention is that an intervening memory test 
(e.g., recognition task) might affect the formation of true and false memory in different ways and 
that this affects the performance on the PCT. However, as already noted, previous experiments 
have revealed (e.g., Howe et al., 2011; Otgaar et al., 2015) that when no memory test was 
included before the final task (e.g., PCT, CRAT), a similar pattern emerged in that false 
memories served as better primes than true memories. Furthermore, one may posit that our 
divergent pattern in true and false memories emerged because the critical lures are items that are 
most associated to the presented items thereby leading to faster identifications. However, in 
previous work, we have replaced critical lures with presented items and we again found that false 
memories served as the best primes (Otgaar et al., 2015). One might also posit that our findings 
are driven by demand effects. Although such an explanation cannot be completely ruled out, this 
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interpretation is difficult to reconcile with our finding that certain memory types have differential 
behavioral consequences. If demand effects are relevant, then one might expect that there would 
be no differences between different memory types in terms of PCT performance.  
Of course, our results should be interpreted with caution because of the following. First, 
in the current experiments, we used the DRM paradigm to elicit true and false memories. 
Although some studies show that (false) memories elicited by this paradigm are linked to 
autobiographical memory (e.g., Gallo, 2010; Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer, & van Oorsouw, 2012), 
there is also evidence showing no link (e.g., Ost et al., 2013; see also Wade et al., 2007). As a 
consequence, our ideas should be further tested using other procedures to elicit nonbelieved true 
and false memories (e.g., imagination inflation). Second, in the present experiments, we used the 
performance of the PCT as a proxy for behavior. One might argue that this type of behavior is a 
far stretch from the type of behavior on which we base our decisions in daily life. So, at the 
minimum, future experiments should attempt to use other tasks measuring other types of 
behavior and examine whether our findings can be replicated in such tasks as well. Finally, 
although our focus was on the effects of nonbelieved memories on the PCT task, when looking at 
other memory types, we did not succeed in obtaining many believed, not-remembered items (see 
Footnote 2). The result is that the PCT data analysis for these items should be regarded as 
exploratory. So, future studies using this procedure should test more participants in order to get a 
sufficient number of all the different memory types.  
Nonetheless, besides these limitations, the present experiments demonstrate hitherto two 
unreported results. First, we have identified a new way to successfully elicit nonbelieved 
memories by resorting to the DRM paradigm. Second, when belief is undermined, nonbelieved 
false memories lead to faster identifications on the PCT while nonbelieved true memories were 
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identified much more slowly. Our experiments suggest that our behavior is adversely affected 
when belief is undermined for true memories and is strengthened when belief is surrendered for 
false memories. Hence, the current experiments indicate that in order to truly examine the 
consequences of belief and recollection, true and false memories should be studied 
simultaneously.   
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Footnote 
1
 The participant with no true memories indicated on the memory and belief ratings to have 
nonbelieved true memories. The reason for this is unclear and similar effects were obtained when 
the participant was dropped from the analyses 
2
 The PCT analyses were performed on 51 participants. The imputation analyses made sure that 
all memory types had an equal amount of data contain mean reaction times. Without the 
imputation of data, the distribution and number of mean reaction time data per memory type was 
unequal and as follows: true memory (n = 49), false memory (n = 39), nonbelieved true memory 
(n = 20), nonbelieved false memory (n = 16), believed, not-remembered true (n = 8), believed, 
not-remembered false (n = 9) 
3
 We conducted Pearson’s correlations between the scores on the DES, GCS, MC-SDS and the 
number of different memory types (true/false memory; nonbelieved true/false memory; believed, 
not-remembered true/false). No statistically significant correlations emerged.  
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Table 1. Percentages of different memory types (BNR = believed, not-remembered) after the 
challenge 
 True 
memory 
False 
memory 
Nonbelieved 
true 
Nonbelieved 
false 
BNR 
true 
BNR 
false 
Percentages 
(number) 
48.95% 
 (n=163) 
21.02% 
(n=70) 
7.2% 
(n=24) 
2.7% 
(n=9) 
1.8% 
(n=6) 
0.3% 
(n=1) 
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Table 2. Percentages of different memory types (BNR = believed, not-remembered) after the 
challenge 
 True 
memory 
False 
memory 
Nonbelieved 
true 
Nonbelieved 
false 
BNR 
true 
BNR 
false 
Percentages 
(number) 
55.42% 
 (n=363) 
17.86% 
(n=117) 
8.2% 
(n=54) 
4.9% 
(n=32) 
2.0% 
(n=13) 
2.4% 
(n=16) 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Perceptual closure task performance of different memory types (error bars represent 
confidence intervals)  
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